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9 June 1967

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Special Assessments on the Middle East

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1. [ ] ONE, coordinator of the assessments produced to support the National Security Council Special Committee on the Middle East, advised me today that:

- a. continued daily publication is not anticipated;
- b. weekend publication is not planned, nor is the need to publish anticipated;
- c. if a heading is used, it will attribute publication to the Central Intelligence Agency only, excluding references to Directorates;
- d. the need for complementary graphics is expected to be minimal.

2. The format used in the initial report will continue. This follows the format of the daily situation report on Vietnam--roman numeral sections with arabic numbered paragraphs.

3. Drafts usually can be expected in Presentation Staff about 1430. Typing and printing should be completed to permit dissemination by 1730. This dissemination schedule is flexible and is currently set in anticipation that the committee will continue to meet at 1830. Changes in the committee's meeting time will dictate changes in production schedules.

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4. The publication will be classified Top Secret [ ] for all issues regardless of the classification of the drafts. No higher classifications are anticipated. [ ] may be added occasionally to the dissemination controls. Hard covers have been printed.

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**SECRET**

8 June 1967

**MEMORANDUM**

**SUBJECT: Prospectus for Intelligence Mechanism to Support President's Special Mid-East Committee**

1. There are two general ways in which Mr. Bundy's requirement for intelligence analysis could be fulfilled. They are complementary, not contradictory, and may be employed singly, simultaneously, or in sequence according to need. The emphasis in each should be on interpretation rather than factual reporting--Task Force and CIB do this. The two are:

- a. Political Situation Report, issued twice a week or at any appropriate interval. It would deal with the attitudes, intentions, and political positions of the several countries in respect of important issues, e.g., boundary changes, force withdrawals, refugees, ship transit. Topical division would be primarily by country, but subjects such as oil and shipping would probably have separate sections. (Sample report outline attached)
- b. Series of essays, issued either at initiative of the CIA working group or in response to requirement of the Bundy operation. Illustrative topics: Problems of Western Oil Interests in Arab countries, Soviet Posture on Israeli Territorial Demands, Is a Truncated Jordan Kingdom a Practical Proposition, Nasser's Position and Influence among Arabs.

2. Since we do not have precise guidance as to the focus and interest of the Bundy operation, I propose we begin with the (a) Situation Report format, supplementing it with essays as appear appropriate, and work into the (b) format. This will permit us to supplement early

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

analyses with greater precision and to respond to Bundy's needs. This approach will permit us to make an initial cut at assessing a wide variety of topics in the first week or so. Many will require refinement in the weeks ahead and may be treated in more detailed papers.

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Chief, NM Staff  
Office of National Estimates

**Attachment**

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**SECRET**

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**Attachment:**

**Topics for Early Consideration in Situation Report**

**I. Primary Interest**

- A. Israel - objectives (political, territorial, transit) following cessation of hostilities.
- B. UAR - domestic position of Nasir regime, his influence with other Arabs, policies toward US and USSR.
- C. USSR - role in post-hostilities environment, losses in area from non-support of UAR, gains at US expense, objectives and likely tactics.
- D. Oil - situation of Western oil interests, likely developments, especially prospects for and timing of re-activation of shut-down facilities.

**II. Secondary Interest**

- E. Jordan - status of regime, refugee problem.
- F. Syria - reasons for relative lack of belligerency, policy toward UAR and Jordan.
- G. Other Arab States - attitudes, ability to influence situation in vicinity of Israel, assessment of solidarity among Arabs.
- H. Shipping - prospects and timing of opening of Suez Canal, situation in respect of transit to Eilat.

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Remarks:

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8 June 1967

MEMORANDUM OF RECORD

SUBJECT: Support for Special NSC Mid-East Committee

1. Mr. Bundy approved the method of producing assessments set forth in attached memorandum. (has copy)

2. For 8 June, we plan a political situation report, to be called Special Assessments on Middle East Situation to differentiate it from Task Force Situation Reports, on the following topics:

- A. Israeli objectives
- B. UAR-Nasir's position, relations with other Arabs
- C. USSR - objectives and likely tactics in next few days to week or so. (This item will be dropped if it duplicates ONE Memorandum now in process.)

3. For 9 June, drafts to be ready at noon, the following:

- A. Turkey - attitude toward dispute, extent of influence able and willing to use on Israel and Arab states
- B. Iran - same. In addition, Iranian intentions on oil shipments
- C. Jordan - Husayn's position; attempt to judge what minimum requirements which Jordan Kingdom must achieve to persist. E.g., can Jordan survive loss of all or part of West Bank? Are refugees becoming a problem?

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Coordinator

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**MIDDLE EAST AFRICA AREA HOLIDAY SCHEDULE**

**30 May 1967**

**The Following Personnel will be on call Tuesday, 30 May 1967**

**FOR THE AREA:**

**AFRICA DIVISION:**

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**FOR THE BRANCHES:**

**SCA:  
GTI:  
AR:  
AF/S:  
AF/W:  
AF/N:**

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